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Abstract—Program obfuscation is a widely employed approach
for software intellectual property protection. However, general
obfuscation methods (e.g., lexical obfuscation, control obfusca-
tion) implemented in mainstream obfuscation tools are heuristic
and have little security guarantee. Recently in 2013, Garg et al.
have achieved a breakthrough in secure program obfuscation
with a graded encoding mechanism and they have shown that it
can fulfill a compelling security property, i.e., indistinguishability.
Nevertheless, the mechanism incurs too much overhead for
practical usage. Besides, it focuses on obfuscating computation
models (e.g., circuits) rather than real codes. In this paper, we
aim to explore secure and usable obfuscation approaches from the
literature. Our main finding is that currently we still have no such
approaches made secure and usable. The main reason is we do not
have adequate evaluation metrics concerning both security and
performance. On one hand, existing code-oriented obfuscation
approaches generally evaluate the increased obscurity rather
than security guarantee. On the other hand, the performance
requirement for model-oriented obfuscation approaches is too
weak to develop practical program obfuscation solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Program obfuscation is a major technique for software
intellectual property protection [1]. It transforms computer
programs to new versions which are semantic-equivalent
with the original one but harder to understand. The concept
was originally introduced at the International Obfuscated C
Code Contest in 1984, which awarded creative C source
codes with “smelly styles”. It now becomes an indispensable
technique for software protection. There are dozens of code
obfuscation ideas proposed in the literature and implemented
by obfuscation tools. However, a truth we cannot ignore is that
current mainstream obfuscation techniques do not provide a
security guarantee.
An obfuscation approach is secure if it guarantees that the
essential program semantics can be protected and demonstrates
adequate hardness for adversaries to recover the semantics.
Existing obfuscation approaches generally cannot meet such
criteria. Moreover, there are many notable attacks on current
obfuscation mechanisms (e.g., [2]–[7]). Such attacks generally
assume particular obfuscation mechanisms and directly attack
them without need to solve any hard problems. Take the
most recent attack by Bichsel et al. [7] as an example,
which recovers a significant portion of the original lexical
information from obfuscated Android apps. The attack just
employs machine learning techniques to predict the original
strings leveraging the residual information. It seems that
the security of program obfuscation is not well-established
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Fig. 1: The distribution of our surveyed obfuscation paper
across years.
as other security primitives, such as cryptography. So one
important question is “do we have secure and usable program
obfuscation approaches? if not, what is the viable means
towards one?”
Recently in 2013, a breakthrough came from the theoretical
perspective. Garg et al. [8] proposed the first candidate
program obfuscation algorithm (i.e., graded encoding) for all
circuits and showed that it could achieve a compelling security
property: indistinguishability. The idea is to encode circuits
with multilinear maps. It has been inspiring many follow-up
investigations which aim to deliver obfuscation approaches
with provable security (e.g., [9, 10]). Figure 1 demonstrates
an explosion of such obfuscation research with a dashed
line. However, such graded encoding approaches are still too
inefficient to be usable. Besides, they focus on obfuscating
computation models, such as circuits or Turing Machines,
rather than real codes. Although circuits and codes are closely
related, graded encoding mechanisms cannot be applied to
practical codes directly. We need to figure out the gaps and
connections in between, which are essential to explore secure
and usable obfuscation approaches.
This survey aims to explore secure and usable program
obfuscation approaches from the literature. Firstly, we study
whether usable code-oriented obfuscation approaches can be
secure. We confirm that no such approaches have demonstrated
well-studied security. The primary reason is that current
evaluation metrics are not adequate for security purposes.
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Existing investigations generally adopte the metrics proposed
by Collberg et al. [11], which are potency, resilience, stealthy
and cost. Note that such evaluation metrics emphasize on the
increased obscurity (i.e., potency) rather than the semantics
that remained clear in an obfuscated program. Therefore, the
metrics guarantee little security.
Secondly, we study whether we can develop usable pro-
gram obfuscation approaches from existing model-oriented
obfuscation investigations. The result is negative. Current
graded encoding mechanisms are too inefficient to be usable.
They only satisfy the performance requirement defined by
Barak et al. [12], i.e., an obfuscated program should incur
only polynomial overhead. The requirement might be too
weak because a qualified program can still grow very large.
Moreover, existing model-oriented obfuscation approaches
are only applicable to real programs which contain only
simple mathematical operations; they do not apply to ordinary
codes with complex syntactic structures. For example, model-
oriented obfuscation approaches do not consider some code
components, e.g., the lexical information and API calls. Such
components serve as essential clues for adversaries to analyze
a program and should be obfuscated.
To summarize, this paper serves as a first attempt to
explore secure and usable obfuscation approaches with a
comparative study of code-oriented obfuscation and model-
oriented obfuscation. Our result is that we have no secure
and usable obfuscation approaches in current practice. To
develop such approaches, we suggest the community to design
appropriate evaluation metrics at first.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we first
discuss the related work in Section II; then we introduce our
study approach in Section III and major results in Section IV;
we survey the literature about code-oriented obfuscation in
Section V and model-oriented obfuscation in Section VI;
then we discuss the possible paths towards secure and usable
program obfuscation in Section VII; finally, we conclude this
study in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
As obfuscation has been studied for almost two decades,
several surveys are available. However, they mainly focus on
either code-oriented obfuscation or model-oriented obfusca-
tion. The surveys of code-oriented obfuscation include [13]–
[17]. Balakrishnan and Schulze [13] surveyed several major
obfuscation approaches for both benign codes and malicious
codes. Majumdar et al. [14] conducted a short survey that
summarizes the control-flow obfuscation techniques using
opaque predicates and dynamic dispatcher. Drape et al. [15]
surveyed several obfuscation techniques via layout tran-
formation, control-flow tranformation, data tranformation,
language dependent transformations, etc. Roundy et al. [16]
systematically studied obfuscation techniques for binaries,
which have been frequently used by malware packers; Schrit-
twieser et al. [17] surveyed the resilience of obfusca-
tion mechanisms to reverse engineering techniques. The
surveys of model-oriented obfuscation include [18, 19].
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Fig. 2: A taxonomy of program obfuscation approaches.
Horvath et al. [18] studied the history of cryptography
obfuscation, with a focus on graded encoding mechanisms.
Barak [19] reviewed the importance of indistinguishability
obfuscation.
To our best knowledge, none of the existing surveys includes
a thorough comparative study of code-oriented obfuscation
and model-oriented obfuscation. Indeed, the two categories
are closely related, because they frequently cite each other.
For example, the impossibility result for model-oriented
obfuscation in [12] has been widely cited by code-oriented
investigations (e.g., [20]). Our survey, therefore, severs as
a pilot study on synthesizing code-oriented obfuscation and
model-oriented obfuscation.
Note that there are another two papers [21, 22] that
have noticed the gaps between code-oriented obfuscation and
model-oriented obfuscation, and they work towards secure and
usable obfuscation. Preda and Giacobazzi et al. [21] proposed
to model the security properties of obfuscation with abstract
interpretation, which can be further employed to deliver
obfuscation solutions (e.g., [23, 24]). Kuzurin et al. [22]
noticed that current security properties for model obfuscation
are too strong, and they proposed several alternative properties
for practical program obfuscation scenarios. Note that such
papers coincide with us on the importance of our studied
problem. We will discuss more details in Section VII.
III. STUDY APPROACH
A. Survey Scope
This work discusses program obfuscation, including both
code-oriented obfuscation and model-oriented obfuscation. A
program obfuscator is a compiler that to transforms a program
P into another version O(P), which is functionally identical
to P but much harder to understand. Note that the concept is
consistent with the definitions of code-oriented obfuscation
by Collberg et al. [25] and model-oriented obfuscation by
Barak et al. [12]. By this concept, we rule out some
manual obfuscation approaches that can not be generalized
or automated in compilers (e.g., [26]).
Moreover, we restrict our study to general-purpose ob-
fuscation, which means the obfuscation has no preference
on program functionalities. However, if some obfuscation
approaches are not designed general programs but are valuable
to obfuscate general programs (e.g., white-box encryption [27,
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28], malware camouflages [29]), we would also discuss them.
Indeed, general-purpose obfuscation is a common obfuscation
scenario and covers most obfuscation investigations.
Finally, we do not emphasize the differences among
programming languages, such as C, or Java. Such differences
are not critical issues towards secure and usable obfuscation. If
one obfuscation approach is studied several times for different
programming languages, we think such investigations are
similar and only discuss a representative one.
B. A Taxonomy of Obfuscation Approaches
1) Taxonomy Hierarchy: For all the obfuscation approaches
within the scope, we draw a taxonomy hierarchy as shown in
Figure 2. In the first level, we divide program obfuscation into
code-oriented obfuscation and model-oriented obfuscation.
Each category can be identified with a groundbreaking paper.
The groundbreaking paper of code-oriented obfuscation was
published in 1997 when Collberg et al. [25] conducted a
pilot study on the taxonomy of obfuscation transformation.
They have discussed several transformation approaches and
evaluation metrics. Since then, obfuscation has been receiving
extensive attentions in both research and industrial fields. Fol-
lowup investigations mainly propose new ideas on obfuscation
transformations in layout level, control level, or data level.
Besides, there are also preventive obfuscation (e.g., [30]–[33])
and polymorphic obfuscation (e.g., [34]–[36]). We defer our
discussion about the details to Section V.
For model-oriented obfuscation, the groundbreaking paper
was published in 2001 when Barak et al. [12] initiated the
first theoretical study on the capability of program obfuscation.
They studied how much semantic information can be hidden
at most via obfuscation. To this end, they proposed a virtual
black-box property and showed that not all programs can be
obfuscated with the property. Hence, what security properties
can obfuscation guarantee and how to achieve the property
are the two important problems of this area. Currently, graded
encoding [8] is the only available mechanism that can be
implemented for obfuscation. We defer our discussion about
the details to Section VI.
Note that other investigations (e.g., [22]) may employ
practical obfuscation and theoretical obfuscation as the cat-
egory names. However, such a categorization approach may
not be very discriminative because practical investigations
on obfuscating codes may also include theoretical studies
(e.g., [37, 38]), and vice versa. Therefore, our categorization
approach with code-oriented obfuscation and model-oriented
obfuscation should be more appropriate.
2) The Differences between Code-Oriented Obfuscation
and Model-Oriented Obfuscation: Code-oriented obfuscation
demonstrates non-trivial gaps with model-oriented obfuscation
as summarized in Table I. They are studied by different
research communities. Code-oriented obfuscation interests
software security experts or engineers, who deal with real soft-
ware protection issues. Model-oriented obfuscation interests
scientists who pursue theoretical study on circuits or Turing
Machines. Besides, model-oriented obfuscation also interests
cryptographers because the candidate obfuscation approaches
are based on cryptographic primitives.
The problems of code-oriented obfuscation and model-
oriented obfuscation are very differet. Firstly, real codes
are more complex than general computation models. For
example, it may include components that are not considered in
circuits, such as lexical information and function calls. Such
components may serve as essential information for adversaries
to interprete the software and should be obfuscated. Besides,
it may contain challenging issues for obfuscators to handle,
such as concurrent operations and pointers. Secondly, the
two categories demonstrate different attacker models. Code
obfuscation assumes the adversarial purpose is to understand a
released software program, and the attacking methods can be
either automated deobfuscation tools or manual inspections.
Such obfuscation approaches are generally evaluated with
the increased obscurity or program complexity, resilience
to automated attackers, stealthy to human attackers, and
costs. On the other hand, model-oriented obfuscation only
assumes automated attackers (e.g., probabilistic polynomial-
time Turing Machine) and it assumes the adversarial purpose
is to infer the functionality of a computation model (circuit
or Turing Machine). Such investigations (e.g., [12]) generally
made assumptions that a program can be represented as
explicit pairs of <input, output>. In this way, one can
evaluate the security with mathematical representations, i.e.,
the probability of guessing the <input, output> pairs from an
obfuscated program. A negligible probability implies that the
obfuscated program leaks little information or it is secure.
Finally, the two categories resort to different security basis
when proposing secure obfuscation solutions. Code-oriented
obfuscation is interested in hard program analysis problems,
such as pointer analysis. Model-oriented obfuscation generally
makes further assumptions that a model contains only basic
mathematical operations. In this way, it can adopt cryp-
tographic primitives based on some mathematical hardness
assumptions, such as multilinear maps.
Note that the differences are summarized based on existing
obfuscation investigations until this survey is published. Some
gaps may be mitigated in the future.
C. Secure and Usable Obfuscation
To facilitate the following study, we clarify the concept
of secure and usable obfuscation. An obfuscation approach
is secure if it performs well in two aspects: obfuscation
effectiveness and resistance. Obfuscation effectiveness means
the confidentiality of program semantics. A secure obfuscation
approach should hide as much program semantics as possible,
especially the essential semantics. Resistance means the
hardness to recover the confidential semantics. A secure
obfuscation approach should be resistant to attacks. The two
aspects are consistent with current evaluation metrics in both
code-oriented obfuscation and model-oriented obfuscation
fields. For code-oriented obfuscation, obfuscation effectiveness
is similar as potency, while resistance includes both resilience
and stealth. For model-oriented obfuscation, effectiveness
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TABLE I: The differences between code obfuscation and model obfuscation
Code-Oriented Obfuscation Model-Oriented Obfuscation
Research Community Software security, software engineering, etc Theoretical computation, cryptography, etc
Obfuscation
Problem
Program to Obfuscate Codes Circuits or Turing Machines
Adversarial Purpose Task-dependent
Semantics that computes outputs
given inputs
Protection Purpose To increase program obscurity To hide mathematical computations
Security-related Metrics
Potency or increased obscurity,
resilience against automated attackers,
stealthy to human attackers
Leaked information measured as the
probability of guessing <input, output>
Security Basis
Hard program analysis problems
(e.g., pointer analysis)
Cryptography algorithms
(e.g., multilinear maps)
means the security property (e.g., indistinguishability) which
defines the maximum information that an obfuscated program
leaks; while resistance means the complexity in attacking an
obfuscation algorithm.
An obfuscation is usable if it can be applied to obfuscate real
codes, and the incurred performance overhead is acceptable
for real application scenarios. Such overhead includes both
program size and execution time. The performance of an
obfuscation approach can be arguably acceptable if it incurs
trivial overhead.
IV. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
In short, we have no secure and usable program obfuscation
approaches to date. The primary reason is that we do not
have adequate evaluation metrics concerning both security and
usability.
Firstly, none of the existing code-oriented obfuscation
investigations evaluate residual semantics in an obfuscated
program. They generally adopt the evaluation metrics proposed
by Collberg et al. [11], which judges the increased obscurity
rather than the unprotected code semantics. None of them
employs evaluation metrics can meet our security requirement,
especially in obfuscation effectiveness. Therefore, designing
appropriate metrics seems the priority for developing secure
obfuscation approaches in the future.
Secondly, current model-oriented obfuscation approaches
are too inefficient to be employed in practice. Such approaches
can satisfy the performance requirement defined by Barak et
al. [12], i.e., the obfuscated program incurs only polynomial
overhead, but they still cost too much. Such a performance
requirement with polynomial overhead is too weak for an
approach to be practical. Besides, the security requirements
(e.g., indistinguishability) for obfuscating circuits might be
too rigid to develop obfuscation solutions, not to mention
a practical one. This may justify why graded encoding
is the only obfuscation approach to date that can meet
a security requirement. Moreover, current model-oriented
obfuscation mechanisms are only applicable to codes with
simple mathematical operations. Neither do we know how to
handle non-mathematical code syntax nor how to handle other
programming concepts, such as control flows and data flows.
V. CODE-ORIENTED OBFUSCATION
In 1993, Cohen [34] published the first code obfusca-
tion paper. Later in 1997, Collberg et al. [25] conducted
a groundbreaking study on the taxonomy of obfuscation
transformations. Then, many obfuscation approaches were
proposed in the literature.
Based on the purpose of protection, we divide code-
oriented obfuscation approaches into three categories: preven-
tive obfuscation, transformation obfuscation, and polymorphic
obfuscation. Preventive obfuscation aims to impede attackers
from obtaining the real codes. Transformation obfuscation
degrades the readability of the real codes. Polymorphic
obfuscation aims to prevent attackers from locating targeted
semantics or features in each obfuscated version. Transforma-
tion obfuscation serves as a major code obfuscation technique,
and most of the obfuscation approaches fall into this category.
We further divide them into layout transformation, control
transformation and data transformation, each of which focuses
on increasing the obscurity of a particular perspective.
A. Preventive Obfuscation
Preventive obfuscation raises the bar for adversaries to
obtain code snippets in readable formats. It is generally
designed for non-scripting programming languages, such as
C/C++ and Java. For such software, a disassembly phase is
required to translate machine codes (e.g., binaries) into human
readable formats. Preventive obfuscation, therefore, aims to
obstruct the disassembly phase by introducing errors to general
dissemblers.
Linn and Debray [30] conducted the first preventive
obfuscation study on ELF (executable and linkage format)
programs, or binaries. They propose several mechanisms
to deter popular disassembling algorithms. To thwart lin-
ear sweep algorithms, the idea is to insert uncompleted
instructions as junk codes after unconditional jumps. The
mechanism takes effect if a disassembler cannot handle such
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uncompleted instructions. To thwart recursive algorithms, they
further replace regular procedure calls with branch functions
and jump tables. In this way, the return addresses are only
determined during runtime, and they can hardly be known by
static disassemblers. Similarly, Popov et al. [32] have proposed
to convert unconditional jumps to traps which raise signals.
Then they employ a signal handling mechanism to achieve
the original semantics. Darwish et al. [33] have verified that
such obfuscation approaches are effective against commercial
disassembly tools, e.g., IDA pro [39].
The idea is also applicable to the decompilation process of
Java bytecodes. Chan and Yang [31] proposed several lexical
tricks to impede Java decompilation. The idea is to modify
bytecodes directly by employing reserved keywords to name
variables and functions. This is possible because the validation
check of identifiers is only performed by the frontend. In this
way, the modified program can still run correctly, but it would
cause troubles for decompilation tools.
To measure the effectiveness of preventive obfuscation,
Linn and Debray [30] proposed confusion factor, i.e., the
ratio of incorrectly disassembled instructions (or blocks, or
functions) to all instructions [30]. Popov et al. [32] also
adopted the metrics. Besides, they proposed another factor
that measures the ratio of correct edges on a control-flow
graph. Such approaches are based on tricks. Although they
may mislead existing disassembly or decompilation tools, they
are vulnerable to advanced handmade attacks.
B. Layout Obfuscation
Layout obfuscation scrambles a program layout while
keeping the syntax intact. For example, it may change the
orders of instructions or scramble the identifiers of variables
and classes.
Lexical obfuscation is a widely employed layout obfuscation
approach which transforms the meaningful identifiers to
meaningless ones. For most programming languages, adopt-
ing meaningful and uniform naming rules (e.g., Hungarian
Notation [40]) is required as a good programming practice.
Although such names are specified in source codes, some
would remain in the released software. For example, the names
of global variables and functions in C/C++ are kept in binaries,
and all names of Java are reserved in bytecodes. Because such
meaningful names can facilitate adversarial program analysis,
we should scramble them. To make the obfuscated identifiers
more confusing, Chan et al. [31] proposed to deliberately
employ the same names for objects of different types or within
different domains. Such approaches have been adopted by
ProGuard [41] as a default obfuscation scheme for Android
programs.
Besides, several investigations study obfuscation via shuf-
fling program items. For example, Low [42] proposed to
seperate the related items of Java programs wherever possible,
because a program is harder to read if the related information
is not physically close. Wroblewski [43] proposed to reorder
a sequence of instructions if it does not change the program
semantics.
In general, layout obfuscation has promising resistance
because some transformations are one-way which cannot be
reversed. But the obfuscation effectiveness is only limited to
layout level. Moreover, some layout information can hardly be
changed, such as the method identifiers from Java SDK. Such
residual information is essential for adversaries to recover the
obfuscated information. For example, Bichsel et al. [7] tried to
deobfuscated ProGuard-obfuscated apps, and they successfully
recovered around 80% names.
C. Control Obfuscation
Control obfuscation increases the obscurity of control flows.
It can be achieved via introducing bogus control flows,
employing dispatcher-based controls, and etc.
1) Bogus Control Flows: Bogus control flows refer to the
control flows that are deliberately added to a program but will
never be executed. It can increase the complexity of a program,
e.g., in McCabe complexity [44] or Harrison metrics [45].
For example, McCabe complexity [44] is calculated as the
number of edges on a control-flow graph minus the number of
nodes, and then plus two times of the connected components.
To increase the McCabe complexity, we can either introduce
new edges or add both new edges and nodes to a connected
component.
To guarantee the unreachability of bogus control flows,
Collberg et al. [25] proposed the idea of opaque predicates.
They defined opaque predict as the predicate whose outcome
is known during obfuscation time but is difficult to deduce by
static program analysis. In general, an opaque predicate can
be constantly true (PT ), constantly false (PF ), or context-
dependent (P ?). There are three methods to create opaque
predicates: numerical schemes, programming schemes, and
contextual schemes.
Numerical Schemes
Numerical schemes compose opaque predicates with math-
ematical expressions. For example, 7x2−1 6= y2 is constantly
true for all integers x and y. We can directly employ such
opaque predicates to introduce bogus control flows. Figure 3(a)
demonstrates an example, in which the opaque predicate
guarantees that the bogus control flow (i.e., the else branch)
will not be executed. However, attackers would have higher
chances to detect them if we employ the same opaque
predicates frequently in an obfuscated program. Arboit [46],
therefore, proposed to automatically generate a family of such
opaque predicates, such that an obfuscator can choose a unique
opaque predicates each time.
Another mathematical approach with higher security is to
employ crypto functions, such as hash function H [47], and
homomorphic encryption [48]. For example, we can substitute
a predicate x == c with H(x) == chash to hide the solution
of x for this equation. Note that such an approach is generally
employed by malware to evade dynamic program analysis. We
may also employ crypto functions to encrypt equations which
cannot be satisfied. However, such opaque predicates incur
much overhead.
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To compose opaque constants resistant to static analysis,
Moser et al. [49] suggested employing 3-SAT problems, which
are NP-hard. This is possible because one can have efficient
algorithms to compose such hard problems [50]. For example,
Tiella and Ceccato [51] demonstrated how to compose such
opaque predicates with k-clique problems.
To compose opaque constants resistant to dynamic analysis,
Wang et al. [52] propose to compose opaque predicates
with a form of unsolved conjectures which loop for a
number of times. Because loop is a challenging issue for
dynamic analysis, the approach in nature should be resistant
to dynamic analysis. Examples of such conjectures include
Collatz conjecture, 5x + 1 conjecture, Matthews conjecture.
Figure 3(b) demonstrates how to employ Collatz conjecture to
introduce bogus control flows. No matter how we initialize x,
the program terminates with x = 1, and originalCodes()
can always be executed.
Programming Schemes
Because adversarial program analysis is a major threat to
opaque predicates, we can employ challenging program anal-
ysis problems to compose opaque predicates. Collberg et al.
suggest two classic problems, pointer analysis and concurrent
programs.
In general, pointer analysis refers to determining whether
two pointers can or may point to the same address. Some
pointer analysis problems can be NP-hard for static analysis
or even undecidable [54]. Another advantage is that pointer
operations are very efficient during execution. Therefore, one
can compose resillient and efficient opaque predicts with
well-designed pointer analysis problems, such as maintaining
pointers to some objects with dynamic data structures [11].
Concurrent programs or parallel programs is another chal-
lenging issue. In general, a parallel region of n statements
has n! different ways of execution. The execution is not only
determined by the program, but also by the runtime status
of a host computer. Collberg et al. [11] proposed to employ
concurrent programs to enhance the pointer-based approach
by concurrently updating the pointers. Majumdar et al. [55]
proposed to employ distributed parallel programs to compose
opaque predicates.
Besides, some approaches compose opaque predicates with
programming tricks, such as leveraging exception handling
mechanisms. For example, Dolz and Parra [56] proposed to use
the try-catch mechanism to compose opaque predicates
for .Net and Java. The exception events include division
by zero, null pointer, index out of range, or even particular
hardware exceptions [57]. The original program semantics can
be achieved via tailored exception handling schemes. However,
such opaque predicates have no security basis, and they are
vulnerable to advanced handmade attacks.
Contextual Schemes
Contextual schemes can be employed to compose variant
opaque predicates(i.e., {P ?}). The predicates should hold
some deterministic properties such that they can be employed
to obfuscate programs. For example, Drape [15] proposed to
compose such opaque predicates which are invariant under a
contextual constraint, e.g., the opaque predicate x mod 3 ==
1 is constantly true if x mod 3 : 1 ? x++ : x = x + 3.
Palsberg et al. [58] proposed dynamic opaque predicates,
which include a sequence of correlated predicates. The
evaluation result of each predicate may vary in each run.
However, as long as the predicates are correlated, the program
behavior is deterministic. Figure 3(c) demonstrates an example
of dynamic opaque predicates. No matter how we initialize ∗p
and ∗q, the program is equivalent to y = x+ 3, x = y + 3.
The resistance of bogus control flows largely depends on the
security of opaque predicates. An ideal security property for
opaque predicates is that they require worst-case exponential
time to break but only polynomial time to construct. Notethat
some opaque predicates are designed with such security
concerns but may be implemented with flaws. For example,
the 3-SAT problems proposed by Ogiso et al. [38] are based
on trivial problem settings which can be easily simplified. If
such opaque predicates are implemented properly, they would
be promising to be secure.
2) Dispatcher-Based Controls: A dispatcher-based control
determines the next blocks of codes to be executed during
runtime. Such controls are essential for control obfuscation,
because they can hide the original control flows against static
program analysis.
One major dispatcher-based obfuscation approach is control
flattening, which transforms codes of depth into shallow ones
with more complexity. Wang et al. [53] firstly proposed
the approach. Figure 4 demonstrates an example from their
paper that transforms a while loop into another form with
switch-case. To realize such transformation, the first step
is to transform the code the into an equivalent reprensentation
with if-then-goto statements as shown in Figure 4(b);
then they modify the goto statements with switch-case
statements as shown in Figure 4(c). In this way, the original
program semantics is realized implicitly by controlling the data
flow of the switch variable. Because the execution order of
code blocks are determined by the variable dynamically, one
cannot know the control flows without executing the program.
Cappaert and Preneel [59] formalized control flattening as
employing a dispatcher node (e.g., switch) that controls the
next code block to be executed; after executing a block, control
is transferred back to the dispatcher node. Besides, there
are several enhancements for code flattening. For example,
to enhance the resistance to static program analysis on the
switch variable, Wang et al. [60] proposed to introduce
pointer analysis problems. To further complicate the program,
Chow et al. [61] proposed to add bogus code blocks.
La´szlo´ and Kiss [62] proposed a control flattening mech-
anism to handle specific C++ syntax, such as try-catch,
while-do, continue. The mechanism is based on abstract
syntax tree and employs a fixed pattern of layout. For each
block of code to obfuscate, it constructs a while statement
in the outer loop and a switch-case compound inside the
loop. The switch-case compound implements the original
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Fig. 3: Control obfuscation with opaque predicates.
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(c) Using switch.
Fig. 4: Control-flow flattening approach proposed by Wang et al. [53].
program semantics, and the switch variable is also employed
to terminate the outer loop. Cappaert and Preneel [59] found
that the mechanisms might be vulnerable to local analysis, i.e.,
the switch variable is directly assigned such that adversaries
can infer the next block to execute by only looking into a
current block. They proposed a strengthened approach with
several tricks, such as employing reference assignment (e.g.,
swV ar = swV ar + 1) instead of direct assignment (e.g.,
swV ar = 3), replacing the assignment via if-else with
a uniform assignment expression, and employing one-way
functions in calculating the successor of a basic block.
Besides control flattening, there are several other dispather-
based obfuscation investigations (e.g., [20, 30, 63, 64]).
Linn and Debray [30] proposed to obfuscate binaries with
branch functions that guide the execution based on the
stack information. Similarly, Zhang et al. [64] proposed
to employ branch functions to obfuscate object-oriented
programs, which defines a unified method invocation style
with an object pool. To enhance the security of such
mechanisms, Ge et al. [63] proposed to hide the control
information in another standalone process and employ inter-
process communications. Schrittwieser and Katzenbeisser [20]
proposed to employ diversified code blocks which implement
the same semantics.
Dispatcher-based obfuscation is resistance against static
analysis because it hides the control-flow graph of a software
program. However, it is vulnerable to dynamic program
analysis or hybrid approaches. For example, Udupa et al. [2]
proposed a hybrid approach to reveal the hidden control flows
with both static analysis and dynamic analysis.
3) Misc: There are several other control obfuscation
approaches that do not belong to the discussed categories.
Examples of such approaches are instructional control hiding
(e.g., [65, 66]) and API call hiding (e.g., [67, 68]). They
generally have special obfuscation purposes or based on
particular tricks.
Instructional Control Hiding
Instructional control hiding converts explicit control instruc-
tions to implicit ones. Balachandran and Emmanuel [65] found
that control instructions (e.g., jmp) are important informa-
tion for reverse analysis. They proposed to substitute such
instructions with a combination of mov and other instructions
which implements the same control semantics. In an extreme
case, Domas [66] think all high-level instructions should be
obfuscated. He proposed movobfuscation, which employs only
one instruction (i.e., mov) to compile the program. The idea
is feasible because mov is Turing complete [69].
API Call Hiding
Collberg et al. [25] proposed a problem that the function
invocation codes in Java programs are well understood but
hard to obfuscate. They suggest substituting common patterns
of function invocation with less obvious ones, such as those
discussed by Wills [70]. The problem is significant, but
surprisingly it has not been studied a lot by other investigations
except [67, 68]. Kovacheva [67] investigated the problem for
Android apps. He proposed to obfuscate the native calls (e.g.,
to libc libraries) via a proxy, which is an obfuscated class
that wraps the native functions. Bohannon and Holmes [68]
investigated a similar problem for Windows powershell scripts.
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To obfuscate an invocation command to Windows objects, they
proposed to create a nonsense string first and then leverage
Windows string operators to transform the string to a valid
command during runtime.
More Tricks
Collberg et al. [25] proposed several other obfuscation
tricks, such as aggregating irrelevant method into one method,
scattering a method into several methods. Such tricks are
also discussed in other investigations (e.g., [42, 71]) and
implemented in obfuscation tools (e.g., JHide [72]). Besides,
Wang et al. [73] proposed translingual obfuscation, which
introduces obscurity by translating the programs written
in C into ProLog before compilation. Because ProLog
adopts a different program paradigm and execution model
from C, the generated binaries should become harder to
understand. Majumdar et al. [74] proposed slicing obfuscation,
which increases the resistance of obfuscated programs against
slicing-based deobfuscation attacks, such as by enlarging the
size of a slice with bogus codes.
Not that all existing control obfuscation approaches focus on
syntactic-level transformation, while the semantic-level protec-
tion has rarely been discussed. Although they may demonstrate
different strengths of resistance to attacks, their obfuscation
effectiveness concerning semantic protection remains unclear.
D. Data Obfuscation
Data obfuscation transforms data objects into obscure
representations. We can transform the data of basic types via
splitting, merging, procedurization, encoding, etc.
Data splitting distributes the information of one variable
into several new variables. For example, a boolean variable
can be split into two boolean variables, and performing logical
operations on them can get the original value.
Data merging aggregates several variables into one variable.
Collberg et al. [75] demonstrated an example that merges
two 32-bit integers into one 64-bit integer. Ertaul and
Venkatesh [76] proposed another method that packs several
variables into one space with discrete logarithms.
Data procedurization substitutes static data with procedure
calls. Collberg et al. [75] proposed to substitute strings with a
function which can produce all strings by specifying paticular
parameter values. Drape [77] proposed to encode numerical
data with two inverse functions f and g. To assign a value
v to a variable i, we assign it to an injected variable j as
j = f(v). To use i, we invoke g(j) instead.
Data encoding encodes data with mathematical functions
or ciphers. Ertaul and Venkatesh [76] proposed to encode
strings with Affine ciphers (e.g., Caser cipher) and employ
discrete logarithms to pack words. Fukushima et al. [78]
proposed to encode the clear numbers with exclusive or
operations and then decrypt the computation result before
output. Kovacheva [67] proposed to encrypt strings with the
RC4 cipher and then decrypt them during runtime.
The data obfuscation ideas can also be extended to abstract
data types, such as arrays and classes. Collberg et al. [75]
discussed the obfuscation transformations for arrays, such as
splitting one array into several subarrays, merging several ar-
rays into one array, folding an array to increase its dimension,
or flattening an array to reduce the dimension. Ertaul and
Venkatesh [76] suggested transforming the array indices with
composite functions. Zhu et al. [79, 80] proposed to employ
homomorphic encryption to obfuscate array. Obfuscation
classes is similar as obfuscation arrays. Collberg et al. [75]
proposed to increase the depth of the class inheritance tree by
splitting classes or inserting bogus classes. Sosonkin et al. [81]
also discussed class obfuscation techniques via coalescing and
splitting. Such approaches can increase the complexity of a
class, e.g., measured in CK metrics [82].
E. Polymorphic Obfuscation
Polymorphism is a technique widely employed by malware
camouflage, which creates different copies of malware to
evade anti-virus detection [83, 84]. It can also be employed
to obfuscate programs. Note that previous obfuscation ap-
proaches focus on introducing obscurities to one program,
while polymorphic obfuscation generats multiple obfuscated
versions of a program simultaneously. Ideally, it would
pose similar difficulties for adversaries to understand the
components of each particular version. It is a technique
orthogonal to the classic obfuscation and mainly designed to
impede large-scale and reproductive attacks to homogeneous
software [85].
Polymorphic obfuscation generally relies on some random-
ization mechanisms to introduce variance during obfuscation.
Lin et al. [35] proposed to generate different data structure
layout during each compilation. The data objects, such as
structures, classes, and stack variables declared in functions,
can be reordered randomly in each version. Xin et al. [83]
further improved the data structure polymorphism approach
by automatically discovering the data objects that can be
randomized and eliminating the semantic errors generated
during reordering. Crane et al. [86] proposed to randomize
the tables of pointers such that the introduced diversity can be
resistant to some code reuse attacks. Besides, Xu et al. [36]
suggested introducing security features in the polymorphic
code regions.
VI. MODEL-ORIENTED OBFUSCATION
Model-oriented obfuscation studies the theoretical obfusca-
tion problems on computation models, such as circuits and
Turing Machines. In 1996, Goldreich and Ostrovsky [87]
firstly studied a theoretical software intellectual property
protection mechanism based on Oblivious RAM. Later,
Hada [88] firstly studied the theoretical obfuscation problem
based on Turing Machines. In 2001, Barak et al. [12] proposed
a well-recognized modeling approach for obfuscating circuits
and Turing Machines, which lays a foundation of this field.
There are two important research topics in this field: 1) what
is the best security property that obfuscation can achieve? 2)
how can we achieve the property?
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TABLE II: A comparison of the security properties for model-oriented obfuscation. Notations: S is a polynomial-size simulator;
A is a polynomial-size adversary; L is a polynomial-size learner; Su is a unbounded-size simulator; P1 and P2 are programs
that compute a same function and have similar cost; P and Q are programs that compute different functions; S
P[q(n)]
u means
querying the oracle access Su for n times; ε is a negligible number.
Security Property Requirement Security Strength
Virtual Black-Box Property (VBBP) |Pr[A(O(P)) = 1]− Pr[SP = 1]| ≤ ε Ideal Security
Indistinguishability Property (INDP) |Pr[A(O(P1)) = 1]− Pr[A(O(P2)) = 1]| ≤ ε INDP < VBBP
Differing-Input Property (DIP)
If |Pr[A(O(P)) = 1]− Pr[A(O(Q)) = 1]| ≥ ε,
then |Pr[A(P′) = 1]− Pr[A(Q′) = 1]| ≥ ε
VBBP > DIP > INDP
Best-Possible Property (BPP) |Pr[L(O(P1)) = 1]− Pr[S(P2)]| ≤ ε BPP = Efficient INDP
Virtual Grey-Box Property (VGBP) |Pr[A(O(P)) = 1]− Pr[S
P[q(n)]
u = 1]| ≤ ε INDP < VGBP < VBBP
A. Security Properties
Barak et al. [12] defined an obfuscator O as a “compiler”
that inputs a program P and outputs a new program O(P).
O(P) should posses the same functionality as P, incur only
polynomial slowdown, and hold some properties of unintelligi-
bility or security. Note that following investigations generally
adopt “polynomial slowdown” to discriminate whether an
algorithm is efficient, but they may adopt different properties
of security. Table II lists several major security properties
discussed in the literature. Next we introduce each property
and justify why the indistinguishability property is mostly
interested by existing obfuscation algorithms.
1) Virtual Black-Box Property (VBBP): Ideally, an obfus-
cated program should leak no more information than accessing
the program in a black-box manner. The property is firstly
proposed by Barak et al. [12] as virtual black-box obfuscation.
Let A be a polynomial-size adversary (e.g., a probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing Machine). VBBP requires that for any
such adversaries, there exists a polynomial-size simulator S,
such that |Pr[A(O(P)) = 1] − Pr[SP = 1]| is negligible.
The expression means any program semantics learned by the
adversary can be simulated with a polynomial-size simulator.
Barak et al. have shown a negative result that at least one
family of efficient programs Pf (x) cannot be obfuscated with
VBBP. Pf (x) can be constructed with any one-way functions,
whose semantics cannot be learned from oracle access.
Therefore, given only oracle access to the function f(x),
no efficient algorithm can compute f(x) better than random
guessing. However, given any efficient program P′f (x), there
exists an efficient algorithm that can compute the function.
In this way, an efficient program that computes a property
of the function can be constructed as D(P′f (x)) → {0, 1},
but it cannot be efficiently constructed from oracle access.
Goldwasser et al. [89] and Bitansky et al. [90] further showed
that some encryption programs cannot be obfuscated with
VBBP when auxiliary inputs are available.
The negative result implies we cannot achieve genreal-
purpose obfuscation with VBBP. However, it does not mean
no program can be obfuscated with VBBP. Point function is
such an exception [91].
2) Indistinguishability Property (INDP) and Best-Possible
Property (BPP): Although VBBP is not universally attainable,
we still need some attainable properties. As an alternative,
Barak et al. [92] proposed a weaker notion: indistinguishability
obfuscation. It requires that if two programs P1 and P2
are functionally equivalent, and they have similar program
size and execution time, then |Pr[A(O(P1)) = 1] −
Pr[A(O(P2)) = 1]| is negligible. Because the notion does not
assume a polynomial-size simulator, it avoids the inefficiency
issue caused by unobfuscatable programs. Barak et al. have
shown that INDP is attainable for universal programs, such
as employing an obfuscator that converts all programs to their
canonical forms or lookup tables. However, such an obfuscator
might be trivial if it is inefficient.
Another important issue is how useful INDP is since it
has no intuitive to hide information. INDP guarantees that
the obfuscated program leaks no more information than any
other obfuscated program versions of similar cost. Therefore,
if we can design an obfuscator with INDP, it guarantees the
obfuscation would have the best effectiveness. To rule out
inefficient obfuscation, Goldwasser et al. [93] proposed best-
possible obfuscation. BPP requires that for any polynomial-
size learner L, there exists a polynomial-size simulator S,
such that |Pr[L(O(P1)) = 1] − Pr[S(P2)]| is negligible.
By assuming a polynomial-size simulator, BPP excludes
inefficient indistinguishability obfuscation. Note that BPP is
also similar to VBBP but it is weaker than VBBP. The
differece is that for BPP, the simulator S(P2) can access
another version of the program, while for VBBP the simulator
SP works as a black-box. Lin et al. [94] proposed another
similar notion exponentially-efficient indistinguishability prop-
erty(XINDP), that requires the obfuscated program should be
smaller than its truth table. Lin et al. showed that XINDP
implies efficient INDP under the assumption of learning with
errors (LWE) [95].
3) More Properties: There are other alternatives dis-
cussed in the literature, such as virtual grey-box property
(VGBP) [96], differing-input property (DIP) [92] and its
variations. Their security levels are considered as between
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VBBP and INDP [18].
DIP is another notion proposed by Barak et al. [92]. For
two programs P and Q of the same cost, it requires if
an adversary can distinguish their obfuscated versions (i.e.,
O(P) and O(Q)), she should be able to differ any versions
of P and Q with the same cost, i.e., to find an input x
such that P′(x) 6= Q′(x). When P and Q compute the
same function, DIP implies INDP. DIP is also known as
extractability obfuscation [97]. However, Boyle and Pass [98],
and Garg et al. [99] showed that DIP is not attainable for
all programs. To avoid the impossibility, Ishai et al. [100]
proposed public-coin DIP. Note that DIP is a stronger notion
than INDP, and we can have many useful applications with a
DIP obfuscator [101].
VGBP [96] is similar to VBBP except that it empowers the
simulator to unbounded size. To be nontrival, it restricts the
simulator to have only limited times of oracle access. Bitansky
et al. [102] shown that VGBP also implies INDP.
In brief, we cannot obfuscate universal programs with
VBBP security, but we may obfuscate universal programs with
INDP security. INDP is also the best-possible security property
if the obfuscation is efficient. Therefore, if VBBP is attainable
for some programs, efficient INDP would guarantee VBBP.
B. Candidate Approach
In 2013, Garg et al. [8] proposed the first candidate
algorithm to achieve INDP. Their approach is based on the
idea of functional encryption [103]. Functional encryption
allows users to compute a function from encrypted data with
some keys. In the scenario of program obfuscation, suppose
a program P computes a function f(x), then the functional
encryption problem is to encrypt the program Enc(P), such
that Enc(P) can still compute f(x) with a public key Ks,
but Ks should not reveal P. Because cryptography algorithms
generally have strong security basis, functional encryption
becomes a dominant idea for program obfuscation with
provable security.
Currently, the only known functional encryption approach
for program obfuscation is graded encoding. It encodes
programs with multilinear maps, such that any tampering
attacks that do not respect its mathematical structure (encoded
with private keys) would lead to meaningless program
executions. To employ graded encoding, Garg et al. [104]
proposed to convert programs to matrix branching programs
(MBP) before encoding. However, such conversion incurs
much overhead. Later, Zimmerman [9], and Applebaum and
Brakerski [105] proposed to encode circuits directly without
converting to MBPs. Next we discuss the two mechanisms.
1) MBP-based Graded Encoding: An essential requirement
to employ graded encoding is that the encoded programs
can be evaluated. MBP is such a model that holds a good
algebraic structure for evaluation even after being encrypted.
There are two phases for MBP-based graded encoding: the first
phase converts programs to MBPs; the second phase encrypts
MBPs with graded encoding mechanisms. Garg et al. [104]
showed that the MBP-based approach is feasible for shallow
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(a) A branching program.
ICMP
…
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(b) A matrix branching program.
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(c) Generate randomized matrix branching program.
Fig. 5: The procedures to convert a program (i.e., if x of int8
equals to 7) to a randomized matrix branching program.
NC1 circuits and can be extended to all circuits with fully
homomorphic encryption.
Converting to MBP
A matrix branching program that computes a function f is
given by a tuple
MBPf = (Input,Mhead, (Mi,0,Mi,1)i∈l,Mtail)
Input selects a matrix Mi,0 or Mi,1 for each i according to
the corresponding bit of input; Mhead is a row vector of size
w; (Mi,0,Mi,1)i∈l are matrix pairs of size w×w that encode
program semantics; Mtail is a column vector of size w.
Given an input x, the MBP computes an output
MBPf (x) ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
MBPf (x) = Mhead × (
l∏
i=1
Mi,xinput(k))×Mtail
Suppose the i-th matrix pair corresponds to the k-th bit of
the input. If the k-th bit is 0, then Mi,0 is selected, or vice
versa. The program output is the matrix multiplication result,
which is a 1× 1 matrix, or a value.
How can we convert general programs to MBPs? The
Barrington’s Theorem states that we can convert any boolean
formula (boolean circuit of fan-in-two, depth d) to a branching
program of width 5 and length ≤ 4d [106]. Garg et al. [104]
simply employ the result and assume the MBP is composed
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of with 5×5 matrices. Ananth et al. [107] found the resulting
MBP following Barrington’s Theorem is not very efficient.
They propose a new approach that converts boolean formulas
of size s to matrix branching programs of width ≤ 2s+2 and
length ≤ s. Besides, there are several other efforts towards
converting to more efficient MBPs, such as [108, 109]. The
conversion generally includes two steps: from a program Pf
to a branching program BPf and from BPf to MBPf .
Pf → BPf : A branching program is a finite state machine.
For boolean formulas Pf ∈ {0, 1}, the finite state machine has
one start state, two stop states (true and false), and several
intermediate states. Sauerhoff et al. [110] demonstrated a
general approach to simulate any boolean formulas over AND
and OR gates with branching programs. It can be extended to
any formulas as they can be converted to the form with only
AND and OR. Figure 5(a) demonstrates an example which
converts a boolean program i == 7 to a branching program.
Suppose i is an integer of eight bits, the boolean formula is
b0 ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ ¬b3 ∧ ¬b4 ∧ ¬b5 ∧ ¬b6 ∧ ¬b7. To model the
branching program we need 10 states: 8 states (s0-s7) that
accept each bit of input, and 2 stop states (s8 for false, and
s9 for true).
BPf →MBPf : To compose a MBPf that is functionally
equivalent to BPf , we should compute each matrix of the
MBPf . In general, Mhead can be an all-zero row vector
except the first position is 1, and Mtail can be an all-zero
column vector except the last position is 1. (Mi,0,Mi,1)i∈len
can be constructed from the adjacency matrices of each state.
For example, if the first bit of input is 0, the station transfers
from s0 to s8, then we start with an identity matrix and
assign 1 to the element of the first row and the ninth column.
Figure 5(b) demonstrates the matrices corresponding to the fist
input bit of Figure 5(a).
Following such converting approaches, the elements of
resulting matrices are either 1 or 0. To protect the matrices,
Kilian [111] proposed that we can randomize the elements of
an MBP while not changing its functionality.
MBPf → RMBPf : To randomize the matrices, we first
generate n+1 random integer matrices RMi and their inverse
RM−1i of size w×w. Then we multiply the original matrices
with such random matrices as follows.
RMhead = Mhead ×RM0
RM0,0 = RM
−1
0 ×M0,0 ×RM1
RM0,1 = RM
−1
0 ×M0,1 ×RM1
...
RMtail = RM
−1
n ×Mtail
The randomization mechanism ensures that all random-
ization matrices RMi would be canceled when evaluating
RMBPf (x). Note that to avoid errors incurred by floating-
point numbers, we should guarantee all the elements of
matrices are integers as shown in Figure 5(c). This is feasible
because when the dominant of RMi is 1, RM
−1
i is also an
integer matrix. Stating from an identity matrix, such RMi
can be obtained via iterative transformations leveraging the
determinant invariant rule.
Graded Encoding
Garg et al. [8] noticed that although the randomized matrix
branching program provides some security, it still suffers three
kinds of attacks: partial evaluation, mixed input, and other
attacks that do not respect the algebraic structure. Partial
evaluation means we can evaluate whether partial programs
generate the same result for different inputs. Mixed input
means we can tamper the program intentionally by selecting
Mi,0 and Mj,1 if i and j are related to the same bit of input.
Graded encoding is designed to defeat such attacks. It is based
on multilinear maps, which can be traced back to the historical
multiparty key exchange problem proposed in 1976 [112, 113].
In general, a graded encoding scheme includes four compo-
nents: setup that generates the public and private parameters
for a system, encoding that defines how to encrypt a message
with the private parameters, operations that declare the
supported calculations with encrypted messages, and a zero-
testing function that evaluates if the plain text of an encrypted
message should be 0. Currently, there are two graded encoding
schemes: GGH scheme [114] which encodes data over lattices,
and CLT scheme [115] which encodes data over integers. Note
that the graded encoding schemes for program obfuscation are
slightly different from their original versions for multiparty
key exchange. For simplicity, below we only discuss the
graded encoding schemes for obfuscation.
The GGH scheme is named after Garg, Gentry, and
Halevi [114], and it is the first plausible solution to compose
multilinear maps. GGH scheme is based on ideal lattices. It
encodes an element e over a quotient ring R/I as e+I, where
I = 〈g〉 ⊂ R is the principal ideal generated by a short vector
g. The four components of GGH are defined as follows.
Setup: Suppose the miltilinear level is κ. The system
generates an ideal-generator g which is chosen as g and g−1
should be short, a large enough modulus q, denominators {zi}
from the ring Rq. Then we publish the zero-testing parameter
as pzt = [h
∏κ
i=1 zi/g]q, where h is a small ring element.
Encoding: The encoding of an element e in set Szi can be
computed as : u := [(e+ I)/zi]q.
Operations: If two encodings are in the same set (e.g., u1 :=
[c1/zi]q and u2 := [c2/zi]q), then one can add up them u1+u2.
If the two encodings are from disjoint sets, one can multiply
the two encodings u1 · u2.
Zero-Testing Function: A zero testing function for a level-κ
encoding u is defined as
IsZero(u) =
{
1 if ||[u · pzt]q||∞ ≤ q
3/4
0 otherwise
Note that u ·pzt = h ·c/g. If u is an encoding of 0, c should
be a short vector in I and the product can be smaller than a
threshold, otherwise, c should be a short vector in some coset
of I and the product should be very large.
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The CLT scheme is another multilinear map construction
approach proposed by Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi [115,
116]. It is based on integers. The four components of the
scheme are defined as follows.
Setup: The scheme generates κ secret large primes {pi},
small primes {gi}, random integers {hi}, random integers
{zi}, a modulo q =
∏κ
i=1 pi, and a zero-testing parameter
pzt =
κ∑
i=1
hi ×
κ∏
i=1
zi × g
−1mod pi ×
∏
i6=i′
pi′mod q
Encoding: Suppose ri is a small random integer, the
encoding of an element e in set Szi is u =
ri·gi+e
zi
(mod pi).
Operation: If ui and uj are encodings in the same set, one
can add them up. If they are from disjoint sets, they can be
multiplied.
Zero-Testing Function: A zero testing function for a level-κ
encoding u is
IsZero(u) =
{
1 if ||u · pzt(mod q)||∞ ≤ q · 2
−v
0 otherwise
In this function, v is a value related to the bit-size of the
encoding parameters [115].
Note that both the GGH scheme and CLT scheme are noisy
multilinear maps, because the encoding of a value varies at
different times. The only deterministic function is the zero-
testing function. However, when a program becomes complex,
the noise may overwhelm the signal. Take the CLT scheme
as an example, the size of pi should be as large as possible
to overwhelm the noise. This requirement largely restrict the
usability of graded encoding.
2) Circuit-based Graded Encoding: Converting circuits
to MBPs incurs much overhead because the size of an
MBP is generally exponential to the depth of a circuit.
To avoid such overhead, Zimmerman [9] and Applebaum
and Brakerski [105] proposed to obfuscate circuit programs
directly. The approach focuses on keyed circuit families
(C(·, k))k∈{0,1}m , and it can be extended to general circuits
because all circuits can be transformed to keyed circuits [117].
Circuit-based graded encoding assumes a circuit structure
can be made public, and only the key needs to be protected.
Figure 6 demonstrates an example that evaluates an obfuscated
circuit given an input x1 = 1, x2 = 0...xn. To generate such
an obfuscated circuit, we encode each input wire with a pair of
encodings corresponding to the input values of 0 and 1, i.e.,
[xi,0, αi]Si,0 ,[xi,1, αi]Si,1 . To support the addition of values
from different multilinear sets, we publish the encoding of
1 for each set, i.e., [1, 1]Si,0 ,[1, 1]Si,1 . Besides, we encode
each key bit as [ki, βi]SK and publish the encoding of 1, i.e.,
[1, 1]SK . Note that the approach introduces a checksum mech-
anism, i.e., xi mod N ≡ x
′
i mod Neval ≡ αi mod Nchk,
s.t. N = Neval · Nchk. Evaluating the obfuscated circuit
just follows the original circuit structure. As a result, we
can compute an evaluation value C(x1, ..., xn, k1, ..., km) ∈
SNeval and a checksum C(α1, ..., αn, β1, ..., βm) ∈ SNchk .
ͳͻ
ǣሺሻሺͳǡ ʹǡǥǡͳǡ ǥሻǡ
Fig. 6: The evaluation process of an encoded keyed circuit
(key: k1...km) given an input is x1 = 1, x2 = 0...xn.
VII. ON SECURE AND USABLE OBFUSCATION
In this section, we carefully justify the prospects of the
existing investigations towards secure and usable obfuscation.
A. With Code-Oriented Obfuscation
In general, existing code-oriented obfuscation approaches
are usable but insecure. We may hope to achieve secure
program obfuscation in the future if we have adequate eval-
uation metrics for security. Our primary supporting evidence
is two folds. Firstly, current security metrics are inadequate.
Secondly, code obfuscation techniques are promising to be
resistant because deobfuscation also suffers limitations.
1) Inadequate Security Metrics: To our best knowledge, all
existing evaluation metrics emloyed by code-oriented obfus-
cation investigations are inadequate concerning the security
discussed in Section III-C. Most investigations and tools
(e.g., Obfuscator-LLVM [118]) adopt the metrics defined
by Collberg et al. [11]. Besides, other evaluation metrics
(e.g., [119]–[122]) proposed in the literature are also in-
adequate. For example, Anckaert et al. [119] followed the
idea of potency and developed more detailed measurements.
Ceccato et al. [120, 121] proposed to conduct controlled code
comprehension experiments against human attackers, such that
we can measure the security with task completion rate and
time. Such metrics are either heuristic or consider little about
protecting essential program semantics.
2) Limitations of Deobfuscation: The most recognized
deobfuscation attacks (e.g., [4, 123]) are based on program
analysis and pattern recognition, both of which suffer limita-
tions. Pattern recognition requires a predefined pattern repos-
itory, and it cannot automatically adapt to new obfuscation
techniques. Program analysis suffers many challenges. For
example, symbolic execution is one major program analysis
approach to detect opaque predicates [6, 124]–[126], but it
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is vulnerable to many challenges, such as handling symbolic
arrays and concurrent programs [127].
Moreover, The Rice’s Theorem [128] implies that automated
attackers would suffer theoretical limitations because whether
a deobfuscated program is equivalent to the obfuscated version
is undecidable. Only when the tricks are known, some
deobfuscation problems can be in NP [37]. Therefore, program
obfuscation approaches are promising to have good resistance.
B. With Model-Oriented Obfuscation
Current model-oriented obfuscation approaches can be
considered as secure but unusable. We may hope to achieve
some usable obfuscation applications if the performance
metrics can be improved or the security requirement can
be weakened. Our evidence is two folds. Firstly, there
are several obfuscation implementations and applications
which demonstrate the usability issue. Secondly, existing
investigations are optimistic about the security of model-
oriented obfuscation.
1) Usability Issues: As the development of model-oriented
obfuscation, several investigations begin focusing on applica-
tion issues, such as [10, 129]–[131]. Apon et al. [129] imple-
mented a full obfuscation solution based on the CLT graded
encoding. It can obfuscate programs written in SAGE [132],
a Python library for algebraic operations. Due to the perfor-
mance issue, they only demonstrated single-bit identity
gate, AND gate, XOR gate, and point functions. Even for an
8-bit point function, it takes hours to obfuscate the program
and several minutes to evaluate the program. Besides, the size
of the resulting program is several gigabytes. Lewi et al. [10]
implemented another obfuscator that can run on top of either
libCLT [115] or GGHLite [133, 134], which are open-source
libraries of multilinear maps. The input program should be
written in Cryptol [135], which is a programming language
for design cryptography algorithms. They also evaluated the
performance when obfuscating point functions. With a better
hardware configuration, it can obfuscate 40-bit point functions
in minutes and evaluate the program in seconds. However,
the obfuscated program sizes are hundreds of megabytes
or even several gigabytes. Their results show that CLT has
better performance over GGH for small-size point functions,
but the advantage declines when the program size grows.
Halevi et al. [131] implemented a simplified version of
the graph-induced multi-linear maps [136] which should
outperform the CLT scheme when the number of branching
program states grows. However, their evaluation results have
not shown fundamental changes of the performance.
To summerize, we can find two usability issues in such
investigations. Firstly, the costs are unacceptable even when
obfuscating straightforward mathematical expressions. The
other issue is that current obfuscation implementations only
focus on elementary mathematical expressions, such as XOR,
point functions, and conjecture normal forms [137, 138]. We
do not know how to handle other advanced mathematical
operations, not to mention complex code syntax.
2) Security of Graded Encoding: Graded encoding is
very powerful, Sahai and Waters [139] showed that INDP
obfuscation can serve as a center for many cryptographic
applications. Moreover, several investigations (e.g., [138,
140]–[144]) showed that an INDP obfuscator can be more
powerful than merely providing INDP under idealized models.
Besides, current graded encoding schemes can be consid-
ered as secure but still need to be carefully explored. Both the
GGH and CLT schemes are based on a new Graded Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (GGDH) hardness assumption for multilinear
maps. The community generally agrees that the security of
GGDH should be further explored, because it cannot be
reduced to other well-established hardness assumptions, such
as and NTRU for encryption over lattices [145]. Indeed, there
are several investigations on cryptanalysis (e.g., [146]–[149])
or proposing newly patched schemes (e.g., [142, 150]–[152]).
However, no severe security flaw has been founded so far that
would obsolesce the approach.
C. With new Evaluation Properties
There are two investigations (i.e., [21, 22]) which coincide
with our results. Kuzurin et al. [22] observed that there are
considerable gaps between practical and theoretical obfus-
cation. On one hand, the security properties in theoretical
or model-oriented obfuscation are too strong; on the other
hand, we have no formal security evaluation approach for
practical or code-oriented obfuscation. They proposed to
design specific security properties for particular application
scenarios, such as constant hiding and predict obfuscation.
Preda and Giacobazziet al. [21] found that existing obfuscation
evaluation metrics are textual or syntactic, which ignore the
semantics. They propose to employ a semantic-based approach
to evaluate the potency of obfuscation. To this end, they
employ abstract interpretations to model the syntactic trans-
formation of obfuscation with semantic-based approach [153].
A semantic-based obfuscation transformation is defined as
τ [P]. The obfuscation τ is potent if there is a property α
such that α(S[P]) 6= α(S[τ [P]]). Such properties can be as
simple as the sign ({+,−, 0}) of a variable or a complex
watermarking [154]. Moreover, the authors have conducted
several preliminary investigations (e.g., [23, 24, 155, 156]) on
employing the ideas to obfuscate simple programs.
Note that all the investigations are still very preliminary.
There is still a large room for improvement in secure and
usable obfuscation.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, this work explores secure and usable program
obfuscation in the literature. We have surveyed both existing
code-oriented obfuscation approaches and model-oriented
obfuscation approaches, which exhibit gaps and connections in
between. Our primary result is that we do not have secure and
usable program obfuscation approaches, and the main reason is
we lack appropriate evaluation metrics considering both secu-
rity and usability. Firstly, we have no adequate security metrics
to evaluate code-oriented obfuscation approaches. Secondly,
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the performance requirement for model-oriented obfuscation
approaches is too weak, and the security requirements might
be too strong. Moreover, we do not know how to apply model-
oriented approaches to obfuscating general codes. Our survey
and result would urge the communities to rethink the notion
of security and usable program obfuscation and facilitate the
development of such obfuscation approaches in the future.
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